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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\.ElL\ T. CALLISTER,
Plaintiff-R e.Y ponde nt,

vs.
LrCY t'. CALLISTER, individually
and as Executrix of the Estate of
Alfred Cyril Callister, deceased,
Defendant-Appellant.

No.
10013

PETITION FOR REHE.ARING AND
SUPPORTING BRIEF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendant-Appellant respectfully moves the court
lor a rehearing in the above entitled case.
The rehearing should be granted for the following
reasons:
1. The court mistook the nature of the proceedings
from which this appeal wast aken.
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2. The decision creates doubt as to future proce-

dures in the trial court:
... 3. The decision overlooks i1nportant provisions of

the probate code as adopted by the Utah Legislature.
4. The fiduciary relationship between Lucy and
Vera, if it ever existed, ended prior to negotiation of
the settlement agreement.

SUPPORTING BRIEF

I.
THE COURT lVIISTOOK THE NATURE
OF . T H E PROCEEDINGS FROM \YHICH
THIS APPEAL WAS TAKEN.
Inasmuch as affirmance of the trial court's decision
is grounded, at least in part, upon the proposition that
"a probate judge 1nust be allowed smne discretion in
supervising its officers," it is fair to conclude that the
court regarded this case as one involving the plenary
power of a probate judge.
Actually, no probate judge as such was involved in
the P.roceeding b~low. The original action to set aside
the transfers to Lucy was a garden-variety civil action
in which v· era was plaintiff and Lucy was defendant.
Moreover, it was merest coincidence that Judge Ellett,
the pretrial judge in CiYil No. 133656, heard the motions for summary judg1nent in Civil No. 145149.
· If Vera had proceeded under Rule 60 (b) Utah
Rules of CiYil Procedure-which, according to Rule

4
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tH (b), applies to proba tc n1atters after joinder of issue
--it would have been dift'erent, but Rule 60 (b) was not

availuhle a ,·cnue of relief because ( 1) Vera waited
too long, and ( 2) she sought relief frmn something in
addition to a "final judgment, order, or proceeding,"
vi7.., a duly executed and aeknowledged absolute release
of Yera 's clain1s against Lucy as an individual or as
cxceutrix.

all

Uule 60 (b) provides, in part, as follows:

T

It

(.

"On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court n1ay in the furtherance of justice re·
lieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgn1ent, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: * * * (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an ad·
rcrsc party * * *. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1),
(:.?) , ( 3) , or ( 4) not tnore than three months
after the judgtnent, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken. * * * The procedure for obtain·
ing a uy relief from a judgment shall be by mo·
tion as prescribed by these rules or by an independent action."

The rule was based upon Federal Rule 60 (b),
except that the three-month period was taken fro1n a
prior Ctah statute, 104-14-.J. Utah Code Annotated
194o3. The earlier statute and Rule 60 (b) regulate and
restrict the plenary power of a court to act upon its
own judgn1ents. See In rc Goddard,s Estate, 73 Utah
:?98. :!7a P.2d 961. If Rule 60 (b) had been in the case,
''judicial discretion" would haYe been. See 7 Moore;s
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Federal Practice, para. 60.19, p. 223, commenting on
Federal Rule 60 (b):
''If the district court has the power to grant
relief, then its discretion to grant or deny relief
norinally involves a discretionary appraisal of
the facts of the particular case and the relief, if
any, to be granted: this n1atter, then, is largely
within the judicial discretion of the trial court."
But this could not have been a proceeding under
Rule 60 (b). See Shaw v. Pilcher~ 9 Utah 2d 222, 341
P.2d 949, in which the court, speaking through Justice
H;enriod, said:
· "Pilchers attack the whole proceeding as being
violative of Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, with its three-month limitations feature relating to entertaining motions for relief
because of mistake, newly discovered eYidence
and the like. A reading of the rule makes it apparent that a motion for relief based on the
grounds_enumerated therein is ineffective if made
three months after the decision in which relief
is sought. The proceeding here, although captioned a 'petition' was in fact a motion made in
the original action, and was primarily on an allegation of 'fraud upon the court.' 'Ve believe in
whole that where 'fraud upon the court' is the
gravamen of the proceeding, such proceeding
must be pursued in an independent action by filing a separate suit, paying the statutory filing
fee therefor ('which was not done here), and the
statutory issuance and service of process."
Counsel for respondent had originally recognized
that Rule 60 (b) relief was not available. An inde6
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pendent action was initiated by a c01nplaint filed on
August :!.7, 1 Hti:J; a new filing fee was paid; a sununons
wus issued; and process was served. :\lotions for sunlmary judgtnent were n1ade, and the question before
this court was not whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion, but 'll'hcther there was any r1enuine
i.~t.vuc mt to any material fact (Rule 56, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure) .

II.
THE DECISION CREATES DOUBT AS
TO .FlrTlTHE PltOCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL
COURT.
In its decision the court quoted language used by
Judge Ellett at the hearing of the motions for summary
judgment. but it apparently overlooked some of the
languaa-e in the judgment itself:
"The stipulation for dismissal and the judgInent of disn1issal in Ch·il No. 133656, and the
release executed by Yera T. Callister on October
10, 1962, are hereby set aside, annulled, and vat'a ted, and Civil Action No. 133656 is hereby
consolidated with the above entitled action, Civil
No. 145149."

The a hove language purports to decide the whole
controversy with respect to the enforceability of the
comprmuise and settlement; yet this court's decision
suggests that some of the equitable defenses may yet be
alive:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for7
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"Does [the Beless) letter suggest a settlement
to perhaps promote the misleading of the tax
authorities '1 Is era the culprit and Lucy the
misled? 1 1he letter is unquestionably capable of
such an interpretationJ but it is also capable of
being interpreted as a plea for Lucy to abandon
an erroneous position for her own good. The
court below has not finally ruled on the suggestion that VeraJs ~hands are uncleanJ and should
not have the aid of the court. This iss·ue may well
yet be tried. But regardless of the determination
of that matter, it does not indicate the court below
erred in rejecting Lucy's conduct as unworthy
of approval, and not desired in the public intest. After the co·urt below determines the facts
in dispute such as the intent of the doctor, the
good faith of era's counsel in writing the letter,
and other contests that may developJ then justice and eq,nity will be dealt between them."
(Emphasis added.)

'r

J

'T

It is universally recognized that an action to set
aside a judgment is an equitable action and is subject
to equitable defenses. Defendant-Appellant has raised
equitable defenses which should be presented for consideration by a fact finder (whether court or judge) as
fact finder - not as judicial administrator exercising
discretion to control "court officers" for misconduct in
some prior term.
In cases such as this, where the claimed misconduct
occurred, if at all, months before relief was sought, full
hearing. and due deliberation appear to be n1ore desirable than to dispatch. Nothing .is likely to happen to
a court's ability to maintain respect pending a trial of
8
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the issue:~ .. \s written, the decision permits a trial court
to depri,·e a litigant of valuable property rights without
u trial or hearing of any kind and in a situation in
which a need for speed is not apparent.

III.
TIIE DECISIOX 0\'ERLOOKS I~IPOR
'L\~T
PUOVISIONS OF THE PROBATE
CODE AS .ADOPTED BY. THE UTAH LEGIS1,,\'fURE.
The probate code recognizes the difference between
the obligations of a personal representative with respect
to assets ''belonging to the estate" and assets transferred
by the decedent (even if wrongfully) prior to his death .
.\s pointed out in 2 Bancroft's Probate Practice (2d
eel.) §47 4, an obligation of a personal representative
to pursue assets which had been fraudulently conveyed
is strictly statutory. It didn't exist in common law because the personal representative was in the same position as the decedent, and one who transfers property
in fraud of creditors cannot get it back.
A l;tah personal representative has no obligation
to recover fraudulently conYeyed assets except upon
application of creditors who will agree to pay costs of
the suit or put up such security as may be ordered by
the court (75-11-14 Utah Code Annotated 1953). No
application of this sort was eYer made by y·era.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Inasmuch as Lucy had no duty to Vera until the
proper application had been made, she could not have
been a fiduciary. Moreover, the suggestion that Lucy
"should have resigned" seetus to place a disability upon
the fiduciary rather than protect the beneficiary from
possible tnisconduct by the fiduciary. If Lucy had resigned, era's position would not have been helped; she
wouldn't have acted any differently, and she wouldn't
have been entitled to get any information fron1 Lucy.
Neither would the new personal representative. Her
position would have been exactly the same. Duties of
fiduciaries should be detertnined on the basis of causa]
relationships, rather than upon purely formal ones
which have nothing to do with Inotivatiuns upon which
parties act.

'r

The court's suggestion that Lucy should not have
undertaken to act as executrix or that she should have
resigned is in contravention of the declared policy of
the Legislature. Under the provisions of 75-4-1 Utah
Code Annotated 1953 those persons having the most
direct interest in the property of a decedent are the ones
who are preferred to act as administrators. This is as it
should be, for if the interested person cannot act, who
would? The fact that there 1nay be conflicts of interest
between the executor and the other heirs or creditors
did not concern the Legislature. Where the conflict of
interest prevents a personal representative f1·mn properly performing his duties, other interested persons can
have him removed. Far·nsworth v. Hatch, 47 Utah 62,
151 Pac. 537.
10
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So1ne eourts have en·n rejected the view that the

adverse interest of the fiduciary is ground for removal.
ln Jl'r.11 t'. Fr,tJ. 1.>.> Iowa~;)-!<, 1:3;) N.l\r.l095, in which
remond of an ~uln1inistratrix was sought on the ground
that she was clairning all of the assets alleged to belong
to the estate were hers under a prior gift by the decedent,
the court said:
"It is true that the adrninistratrix is claiming
practically all of the estate after the payment of
debts, funeral and other expenses, including
nwnun1ent and burial lots; but her claims have
been open and above board and she has asserted
thern in a proper 1nanner, both by petition to the
eourt in which she 1nade plaintiff herein a party,
and by application for the appointment of a special adtninistrator to pass upon her claims as is
authorized by §3346 of the Code. True, her
clai1ns are in hostility to the interest which plaintiff is clai1ning as father to the decedent, but no
nwre so than any other claim against the estate
would be. Defendant can take nothing without
an order of the court} and has no advantage over
t!tt plaintiff in ·cirtue of her appointment as administratrit~'. '·' (Ernphasis added.)
In the instant case Lucy had no advantage over
\"era by ,·irtue of her appointment as the executrix.

IV.
THE FIDlTCIARl~ RELATIONSHIP BET\YEEX LlTcy· AXD '7"ERA, IF IT EY"ER
EXI~TED. EXDED PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIOX OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREE)IEXT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
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The cases cited under Point I of Appellant's Brief
and Point III of the Appellant's Reply Brief indicate
that when the parties choose to deal with each other at
arm's length, notwithstanding the fiduciary relationship, they should be treated like any other parties. See
Collins v. Collins~ 48 Cal.2d 325, 309 P.2d 420; 1Vadd;lJ
v. Grimes~ 154 Va. 615, 153 S.E. 807; and In re Blodgetfs Estate, 93 Utah 1, 70 P.2d 742 (in which the
holding supports Lucy's position); Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281; Western
Grain Company Cases~ 264 Ala. 145, 85 So.2d 395.
CONCLUSION
If this case had been treated as an independent
action to set aside a judgment, as it should have been,
Vera would have had the burden of establishing
gr.ounds for intervention of a court of equity-of showing that she, not a prior term's probate or trial judge,
is entitled to relief. She would have to establish that
she was wrongfully induced to enter into a compromise
and settlement agreement; and Lucy would have had
the right to show that Vera's own conduct precludes
equitable relief.
But the court's mistaken assumption that the case
involved a trial or probate court's plenary power over
its own judgments apparently led it to the conclusion
that the n1yriads of cases that have dealt with contracts,
lawsuits and settlements between fiduciaries and their
beneficiaries had no bearing upon the validity of the
12
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trinlt·ourt's adion, since the inquiry, under the theory
adopted by the court, was whether it had abused its
dist'l'etion. The cited eases are not controlling upon
tht.· question of whether a court has abused its discretion
i11 t.•xcrTising its plenary power. but they are indisputably relevant to an independent action to set aside a
stipulation, j udgtnent, and release.
Conferring upon a trial judge the power to vacate
judgments long after the~· are entered, without a hearing, merely because tnisconduct of a "court officer" is
asserted. has ituplications far beyond future conduct
of personal representati,·es. Attorneys are also officers
of the court. and their adi,·ities are involved in virtually
l'Ver~· j udgtnent entered.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
F~bian & Clendenin
800 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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